Two peace agreements, actually: one among the warring parties in Bosnia and another between Bill Clinton and the Republicans in Congress. The first negotiation seemed to be on the verge of success late last week. At an air base near Dayton, Ohio, U.S. mediator Richard Holbrooke led the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia through the final, maddeningly difficult details of an agreement that would preserve Bosnia as a single state, at least on paper, and end the ethnic fighting there, at least for now. “R’s not exactly a good deal,” said Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbey, who resigned so that his job could be given to a Bosnian Croat in a power-sharing arrangement. “But anyway, a bad peace is better than war, right?”
The initialing of the document in Dayton was to be followed, two weeks later, by a formal signing ceremony, after which NATO combat units would start to arrive in Bosnia. The signing was originally planned for Paris, but with Republicans denouncing the U.S. deployment, the administration considered trying to move the ceremony to the White House. In a letter to Speaker Newt Gingrich, Clinton said that if the agreement went through, he would send about 20,000 U.S. troops to help enforce the settlement in Bosnia. They would stay for about a year, he wrote, at a cost of about $1.5 billion. He added that it was “not possible to make meaningful casualty predictions.” Congress would have a chance to pass judgment on the mission before the treaty is signed.
House Republicans responded by pushing through a bill to block any spending on a U.S. deployment in Bosnia. “Before our troops hit the ground, I want the answer-for what?” said the sponsor of the measure, Rep. Joel Heflley of Colorado. The vote for the bill was far from veto-proof, and in the end, Congress will probably go along with the deployment, if only because impeding it would almost certainly shoot down any peace agreement. Having registered their objections, the Republicans can blame Clinton for every setback-and every U.S. casualty-as the 1996 election campaign unfolds.
Congressional Republicans were not the only ones who had been dragging their feet. NATO’s Bosnia force was supposed to be about 60,000 strong. But in the early stages of the planning for IFOR, pledges added up to only about 50,000 troops. The initial plan drawn up by NATO’s military commander, U.S. Gen. George Joulwan, said France would need to provide 12,000 to 15,000 troops for its sector of Bosnia (map). But French President Jacques Chirac balked at that big a commitment. Instead, France may contribute only a little more than the 7,000 troops it already has in Bosnia as U.N. peacekeepers.
Then the allies mounted a recruiting drive among non-NATO nations, in-eluding some Muslim countries with competent armed forces, such as Pakistan. In the end, 20 non-NATO countries pledged troops, which will more than suffice to fill Joulwan’s quota. But even the United States wanted to hold down the size of its Bosnian contingent; the White House preferred a more politically palatable number under 20,000, if at all possible. And the administration carefully talked only about “troops in Bosnia,” neglecting to mention the many thousands more who will handle logistics in Croatia and Hungary and nm air and naval operations from ships offshore and bases in other countries.
The first NATO troops will arrive in Bosnia even before the formal signing. “Assessment teams” will size up the local infrastructure and start to install a communications system for IFOR. Within hours after the treaty is signed, an “enabling force” of up to 2,000 specialists in logistics and communications will be on its way to the region. The first U.S. combat unit is expected to arrive within two weeks: 5,000 light infantry from the Army’s Southeast European Task Force, based at Vicenza, Italy. The schedule calls for half of IFOR to be in place a month after the signing, with the rest deployed within three months. The main American muscle will be provided by the First Armored Division, based in southern Germany–a slow-moving behemoth with 16,300 troops, 348 tanks, 652 armored personnel carriers and 3,500 other vehicles, plus artillery and antiaircraft. It will take 200 trainloads to move the division from Bavaria to Bosnia.
The overall commander of IFOR, U.S. Adm. Leighton (Snuffy) Smith, will set up his headquarters in Sarajevo. The country will be divided into three sectors (map): the American, headquartered at Tuzla; the British, at Gornji Vakuf, and the French, at Sarajevo. Troops provided by other nations will be assigned to various sectors. A Russian contingent of roughly 3,000 men will probably deploy in the U.S. zone. The Russians insist they are not serving under NATO’s command but are merely part of a multinational peacekeeping force. But they would be under the day-to-day control of the First Armored’s commander, Maj. Gen. William Nash. Defense Secretary William Perry said the Russians cannot “pick and choose” which orders they will obey.
IFOR will serve as a buffer for the warring parties. Joulwan’s plan calls for demilitarized zones 2.5 miles wide between the Serbs and their Muslim and Croatian foes. Heavy weapons would be withdrawn to designated storage sites. But how much force will the allies use to implement the plan, and under what circumstances will they open fire? Last month Joulwan said IFOR will be “a Chapter 7 versus a Chapter 6 operation.” Chapter 6 of the U.N. Charter provides for the “pacific settlement of disputes”–lightly armed peacekeeping–while Chapter 7 provides for a more robust response to “acts of aggression” and other threats. Desert Storm, the war against Iraq, was a Chapter 7 operation.
This time, IFOR troops will employ standard NATO rules of engagement, meaning they can shoot first if they think they have to. The plan is for IFOR to retaliate very heavily against the first sign oF resistance. But the rules of engagement still aren’t entirely clear to the men who will have to live with them in the field. “They won’t be simple,” said a U.S. officer in Europe, “and no one is happy with them in their present state.” A major sticking point is how to minimize what the military calls “collateral damage”-the unintended killing of civilians.
Bill Clinton hopes the job will be done in a year, with at least some of the boys coming home before Election Day. Elements of the armored division might be among the first to leave; at around 70 tons, their M1-A2 tanks are too heavy for most of Bosnia’s roads and bridges. How will IFOR know when its job is done? The “exit strategy” was still a bit fuzzy, but sources said the administration had developed three criteria that, taken together, would justify a withdrawal: (1) the successful separation of the warring parties; (2) the holding of national and local elections, which the parties promised to do next year, and (3) the arming and training of Bosnian government forces so they can hold their own on the battlefield. The administration may spell out its exit plan in public this week, which makes some U.S. officials uncomfortable. “If it’s published, then we’ll be held to it by the press,” says a military planner. “They’ll have their little checklist and eat us alive.”
A full-scale resumption of the war by the Serbs and their enemies could be another signal for withdrawal. But the allies don’t want to be chased out, so rather than just turn tail, they will try to stop any new fighting. In the early stages of the mission, their most dangerous adversary could be Bosnia’s nasty climate–“General Winter,” as a Pentagon officer puts it. There were 27 inches of snow on Mount Igman outside Sarajevo last week. Planners worried about the casualties that might result from armored personnel carriers skidding off icy mountain roads. StiR, a cold welcome to Bosnia is probably better than a hot departure.
The implementation plan carves Bosnia into three military sectors, with buffer zones 2.5 miles wide separating the combatants. Heavy weapons are supposed to be moved to designated storage areas.
The day after the treaty is signed, 2,000 NATO advance team members will enter Bosnia to set up sector headquarters in Sarajevo, Tuzla and Gornji Vakuf.
On days 10 to 14, the first U.S. brigade will helicopter into Tuzla from Italy. These 5,000 troops will help the British and French transfer control from U.N. to NATO.
After 30 days, 30,000 troops will arrive, traveling across the Adriatic and by rail from Germany. After 90 days, all 60,000 members of the force should be on hand.
BRITISH SECTOR Britain 12,000 Canada 4,000 Belg./Neth. 4,000 U.S./RUSSIAN SECTOR U.S. 20,000 Russia 3,000 FRENCH SECTOR France 10,000 Spain 4,000 Italy 4,000 OTHER FORCES Pakistan 4,000 Germany 5,000 Swed./Fin. 1,000 Malaysia 1,000 Czech./Slov. N/A
