The hard-line attack on Gorbachev - perhaps the strongest one yet–began when his own prime minister, a stubborn Communist Party apparatchik named Valentin Pavlov, asked the Parliament for authority to issue emergency economic decrees without permission from Gorbachev. “The president’s working day is 14 hours,” he said. “In my opinion, there is a lot the president simply can’t do.” Pavlov also criticized the Grand Bargain reform plan worked out by liberal Soviet economist Grigory Yavlinsky and a team of academics at Harvard University, under which rapid Soviet change would be supported by Western financial aid. “I know a few gentlemen from Harvard University,” sneered Pavlov, a beefy 53-year-old who wears his hair in a crew cut. “They do not know our life. We can hardly expect them to explain everything to us.”
“Coordinated campaign’: Soviet newspapers and legislators said Pavlov had formidable backing. His chief henchmen: Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov, KGB secret police chief Vladimir Kryuchkov and Interior Minister Boris Pugo, who runs the uniformed police. Other supporters included conservative deputies who may lose their seats in elections Gorbachev is likely to call next year–potentially a majority of the Parliament. Sergei Ryabchenko, a deputy from Kiev, called the power play “a coordinated campaign to remove the president of the U.S.S.R. from power.” Newspapers warned of a parliamentary coup by the Pavlov camp. But when the showdown came, the hard-liners simply didn’t have the horses - this time.
Gorbachev could have fired the prime minister, but getting parliamentary approval for a replacement might have been difficult, and the battle could have delayed reform. Instead he apparently decided to pressure Pavlov during an eight-hour meeting the day before the parliamentary debate. Exactly what was said is not known; Gorbachev may have promised Pavlov he could stay on in office if he withdrew his request for new powers. “The president persuaded Pavlov to cooperate,” said one insider. In public the next day, Gorbachev assured the Supreme Soviet that “there are no problems between us.” Pavlov, his head uncharacteristically bowed, limply agreed. But Gorbachev also said his own economic plan would combine proposals from Yavlinsky and Pavlov.
The timing of the conservative challenge surprised no one, coming on the heels of Boris Yeltsin’s victory in the Russian Republic’s presidential election. Yeltsin, who made a triumphant visit to the United States last week, is committed to shifting decision-making powers on the economy and other pivotal issues from the Kremlin to the individual republics. He also wants international recognition for himself and the Russian Republic, and he took that message to Washington for a meeting with George Bush. That makes him a direct threat to Pavlov and other hard-liners who want to retain central authority in Moscow. Worst of all from their point of view, Gorbachev has been moving toward Yeltsin and other republic leaders since last April, when he agreed with nine of the 15 republics on new power-sharing arrangements and more radical economic reform.
Some foreign diplomats and some Russians thought the hard-line uprising might have been staged by Gorbachev’s camp for propaganda purposes, to warn the West of what might happen if he does not receive financial aid. Gorbachev’s advisers denied that any such gamesmanship was involved. “We aren’t that clever,” said one.
Coming after such a strong challenge from the reactionaries, Gorbachev’s parliamentary performance was heartening for the West. For the first time, the Soviet leader publicly addressed the crux of the economic-reform question, the estimated 25 percent of the Soviet gross national product that still goes to the military. Cutting that figure substantially is likely to be a key condition for any Western aid. At one point in the debate, a conservative deputy complained bitterly about the West setting conditions for aid. “I don’t like the fate of my country decided in the White House,” he said. “The economy of this country is overmilitarized,” Gorbachev replied angrily. “We have to remove this burden and turn the economy over to the people. Otherwise my mission will be useless and I will have to resign.” It was his strongest commitment yet to reduce the swollen military budget for the benefit of the civilian economy. The West has a stake in Gorbachev’s ability to keep that promise.
