Through this maelstrom glided the eloquent, apparently confident figure of Gorbachev–more verbose than usual, but otherwise dominant. Yet my respect for this extraordinary tour de force could not obscure the conviction that Gorbachev’s role as a deus ex machina is ending. Not that I expect him: to be overthrown. I have no: way of judging such a prospect; I would surely regret it. But the upheaval he has wrought will force Gorbachev to rely increasingly on unfamiliar constituencies.
Gorbachev has already assured his place in history. He diagnosed the maladies of his society and set about courageously to remedy them. History may record that he produced consequences far more dramatic than he ever intended. I have yet to meet a Soviet personality in a position to know who believes that Gorbachev’s purpose in 1989 was to start dismantling the Soviet empire. What he appears to have sought was to foster growing access to Western resources and technology by putting in place in Eastern Europe reformist Communists capable of liberalizing, not overthrowing, existing institutions. But when matters got out of hand, Gorbachev displayed extraordinary fortitude. He confined the Soviet Army to its barracks even while Communism was being dismantled all over Eastern Europe. Gorbachev would not be the first revolutionary to set in motion events that sweep beyond his design. But since history judges results more than intentions, it will be kind to Gorbachev.
Still, the disparity between intentions and results makes Gorbachev’s power base uncertain. Either at the next summit or soon thereafter, Gorbachev will likely be answerable to a different constellation of forces. He rose to office as the standard-bearer of the Communist Party. When it became an obstacle to reform, he set about to dismantle it with a complicated system of elections designed to vent resentments but incapable of creating an alternative national structure. On paper this must have looked like a masterful, even Machiavellian, maneuver to fragment the opposition and enhance personal rule. But the artfully designed elections have caused something akin to democracy to emerge in the 16 constituent republics, including the Russian republic, which comprises three quarters of the territory and over half of the population.
Desirable outcome: In the face of these centrifugal trends, perestroika can proceed and national unity be maintained only by a deal between the center and the elected heads of the various republics. They have spoken of a confederal structure in which defense would be national but each republic could evolve internal policy and some foreign policies. From the point of view of international stability, that would be a desirable outcome–a Russia strong enough to defend itself but too decentralized to attack. But it would confront Gorbachev with the risk of being perceived as a symbol of the central apparatus he sought to overcome.
If he fails, he may emerge too strong to be replaced but too weak to impose his will. Probably he can regain legitimacy in only one of two ways: by repression, which would risk his relations with the outside world, or by cutting some sort of deal with the elected leaders in the republics–thus transforming the Soviet state. Whatever course he chooses, Gorbachev will represent a different Russia in the future–if he survives the forces he has unleashed.
