The report prompted tense debate within the Bush administration over possible Iraqi involvement in the attack. Al-Ani is believed to be a hardened Iraqi intelligence agent. In late April the Czech Foreign Ministry called in Iraq’s mission chief in Prague and demanded that al-Ani leave the country within 48 hours. Why? U.S. and Czech officials told NEWSWEEK that al-Ani had been spotted “casing” and photographing the Radio Free Europe building in Prague. Czech officials feared al-Ani was plotting an attack on Radio Free Europe, which incurred Saddam’s wrath when it began broadcasting into Iraq in 1998. “I told the Iraqi chief of mission that [al-Ani] was involved in activities which endanger the security of the Czech Republic,” Hynek Kmonicek, the Czech Foreign Ministry official who ordered al-Ani’s expulsion, told NEWSWEEK.
Kmonicek, now Czech ambassador to the United Nations, compiled a considerable file on al-Ani. One red flag was that al-Ani “was never present at any diplomatic event.” Iraqi opposition leaders in Prague say that al-Ani paid a number of visits to Iraqi dissidents in that city and sought to persuade them to return to Iraq, once threatening a young defector if he refused to do so. What link these activities might have with his meetings with the Egyptian-born Atta is unclear. “It’s suspicious,” says Kmonicek. “Why would a diplomat with no diplomatic duties meet with a student of architecture? How is it possible they even know each other?”
Those questions have been made even more difficult by confusion about the timing of Atta’s visits to Prague. U.S. officials have confirmed at least one brief, previous trip–in early June 2000–when Atta, having driven a rental car from Germany, hopped a plane in Prague and flew to Newark, N.J. There is no hard evidence Atta met with al-Ani during that trip. But Czech police are now investigating whether Atta made even more trips to Prague using a false name and passport.
Debate over “the Iraqi connection” is sharpening. Some Bush hard-liners, who want to oust Saddam with military action, say the State Department and CIA are downplaying clues of possible Iraqi complicity. One example: when anti-Saddam Iraqis told U.S. officials two weeks ago of a defector with information about “terrorist training” operations at an Iraqi facility called Salman Pak, the CIA officer on the case was openly dismissive. But others say it’s currently impossible to draw any firm conclusions about Saddam’s involvement. Two years ago a top Iraqi intelligence official flew to Afghanistan, reportedly to offer bin Laden “refuge” in Iraq. According to an ex-CIA official, bin Laden said no, fearing Saddam would “use” him. Did bin Laden later change his mind, giving Iraq a role in the attack? U.S. officials can’t say for sure. Until they can, Saddam may stay out of the military’s cross hairs.
