In the era of Mao Zedong and, to a lesser extent, Deng Xiaoping, Beijing made crucial domestic- and foreign-policy decisions with scant regard for what ordinary Chinese thought. Thus, Mao could invite Richard Nixon to China during the Cultural Revolution–when every Chinese was taught that the United States was an evil imperialist power. Likewise, Deng singlehandedly finessed the sticking point of continued American arms sales to Taiwan when Sino-American negotiations over the normalization of relations hit an impasse in 1978.
The passing of such powerful leaders has resulted in a collective leadership of equals in Beijing. Nominally, top officials like Jiang Zemin seem to hold more power than others. In reality, they are coalition builders. And although trading political favors remains the dominant currency in coalition politics, public opinion has gradually gained importance as a factor that can shift policy debates in cases when the internal political balance is extremely delicate. Leaders who represent different bureaucratic and institutional interests often invoke public opinion (based on internal government-commissioned polls and classified reports) to push their agendas.
The declining appeal of communism is also crucial. Whereas past policies were largely determined by that ruling ideology, its erosion means that the struggle over policy has become a more spirited debate in which many political factors, including public opinion, carry weight. Without any ideological reason to command loyalty, too, the regime must be far more sensitive to its standing among ordinary Chinese.
Regrettably, public opinion appears, so far, to have helped conservative causes more than reformist ones. In domestic policy, fear of massive layoffs in state-owned enterprises and the ensuing social unrest has slowed down the pace of economic reform. (At the same time, despite widespread public anger at rampant official corruption, the government still shies away from targeting politically connected cadres.) When it comes to the battle over foreign policy, China’s moderates are hands-down losers. Rising nationalist sentiments among ordinary Chinese citizens and their growing resentment of the West’s endless and, frequently unfair, criticisms of China have enormously benefited those leaders with a dim view of the West.
There is much irony in all this. Of course, even in the democratic West, raw public opinion is seldom a useful guide for sound policies. When wishfully applied to China, such thinking only invites shock and disillusionment.
