It is still possible that there will not be another air war against Iraq. But if it happens, the campaign will be longer and more difficult than most Americans seem to expect, administration sources say. Iraqi air defenses–smaller now than they were at the start of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, but better organized–may well shoot down some U.S. planes, killing the crews or making them prisoners to be paraded through the streets in manacles. The campaign will not end in three or four days, as some news accounts have suggested. It may take that long just to knock out Iraq’s air defenses.
Then the attackers–American air crews and a few British allies–will pound away at the sources of Saddam’s strength: his Republican Guard, command-and-control networks and facilities where he may be trying to develop doomsday weapons. The list includes “sensitive and sovereign sites,” such as eight presidential palaces, that have been put entirely off-limits to United Nations arms inspectors. Hundreds of Iraqi civilians could die in the bombing, martyrs to American air power and the indifference of their own ruler, who in the past has used them as human shields. The air war could go on, at high intensity, for several weeks.
The question that doesn’t have a good answer: what will the strikes accomplish? Secretary of Defense William Cohen told NEWSWEEK the aim would be “to curtail [Saddam’s] ability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction and to curtail his ability to threaten his neighbors.” Airstrikes probably cannot force Iraq to comply with U.N. resolutions. “There is no military option that would be an adequate substitute for [U.N.] inspectors on the ground,” Cohen said. He noted that many of the potential weapons sites also have normal peacetime functions, such as milk processing. “Are we supposed to bomb all those?” he asked.
There’s little chance that airstrikes will kill Saddam or drive him from power. He did not succumb to a much more massive air and ground assault seven years ago. With myriad bunkers for Saddam to hide in, only the greatest good luck–the right bomb in the right place at the right time–would kill him now, and short of that, his control of Iraq does not seem to be in jeopardy. “The Americans will kill many people, destroy many buildings, but if they think that will get him out, they don’t know the region,” says an Arab diplomat.
That’s why Washington still hopes for a diplomatic solution, despite some tough talk from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. She made the rounds in Europe and the Middle East last week, showing off an assertive new stance that could be described as “don’t ask, just tell.” “I am not going anywhere to seek support,” she said before leaving Washington. “I am going to explain our position. And while we always prefer to [act] multilaterally . . . we are prepared to go unilaterally.” After meeting in Madrid with Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, she said she was “skeptical that diplomacy will solve this problem,” adding: “Our patience is running out.” Seizing the moral high ground– and the microphone–Primakov replied: “We’re a little bit more patient, you know.”
In fact, so was Washington. Cohen may also visit the gulf, and the air war isn’t likely to begin until after his return. The administration hopes to obtain permission to use air bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain for an assault on Iraq. So far, the gulf Arabs are reluctant to provide such visible support. They loathe Saddam, but they don’t want to sign up for another campaign unless they are convinced it will leave him seriously weakened. Still, Cohen said he expected that “we will have the support necessary to carry out the operations that are necessary.”
Saddam does not seem to fear even an extensive air assault. His people suffered from earlier attacks, but the dictator and his regime have prospered. What Saddam does want is a lifting of the U.N. sanctions that have crippled Iraq’s economy since the end of the gulf war. After the previous crisis over arms inspections last fall, Russia and France proposed that sanctions be lifted step by step. Washington successfully opposed the idea, even though the inspections of Iraq’s nuclear, chemical and missile facilities have basically been completed, leaving only the biological-warfare program to be shut down. A revived step-by-step proposal might give Saddam an incentive to cooperate, allowing arms inspectors access to sensitive sites. Last week U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan produced a formula that could be helpful, proposing a large increase in the program–long endorsed by Washington–that allows Iraq to sell some of its oil to buy food and medicine.
Without some sort of compromise, a new air war seems inevitable. By this week, the United States will have three aircraft carriers in the region, supported by a smaller British flattop (chart). But naval aircraft alone cannot do the job the way the Pentagon would like to do it. Carriers are not designed for extended campaigns against land targets protected by modern antiaircraft. They cannot launch F-117 stealth attack planes, the best spearhead for crippling Iraq’s air defenses. The Navy also has nothing to match the Air Force F-15E, which carries heavy, laser-guided GBU-28 “bunker buster” bombs that would be needed against Saddam’s buried facilities.
The Air Force already has six F-117s bedded down at Al Jabr air base in Kuwait. But Washington must get permission to use that field in an attack on Iraq, and for the kind of campaign it has in mind, it also needs the bases in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. As for the timing, U.S. planners would prefer to attack Baghdad on a moonless night. The stealth planes are nearly invisible to radar but can be seen by the human eye when silhouetted against the moon. There will be no moon over Baghdad for six nights starting on Feb. 20 (though the attack could begin some other night, at an hour when the moon is not up).
If the window for a land-based attack opens in the latter half of this month, it will close before the end of March, when Muslim pilgrims start heading to Saudi Arabia for the annual hajj. Privately, U.S. officials recognize the risks of such a campaign. They acknowledge that force is the worst option–except for doing nothing and allowing Saddam to defy the United Nations and get away with it.
